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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
FRANKIE ARNOLD WHITE, : Case No. 20090979-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
The State charged Frankie White with assaulting Dexter Thomas and causing 
substantial bodily injury, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(3)(a) 
(2008). Also, it charged an enhancement for in-concert conduct, elevating the offense to 
a third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(3)(b) (2008). At trial and on 
appeal, White maintains the evidence was insufficient to support the felony conviction. 
Specifically, the injury to Thomas was not substantial under Utah law. Br. Appellant. 
The legislature has defined the phrase "[substantial bodily injury" to mean 
"protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12) (2008). 
In this case, Thomas did not claim that he suffered pain; he did not testify that he 
received any medical aid or treatment; he did not claim to be impaired; and he did not 
describe a disfigurement. In fact, the State's evidence shows that during an altercation 
involving White and his cousins, Thomas received a slight cut on his face by his right ear. 
See State's Ex. 1 & 2, attached to Br. Appellant as Addendum C. State witnesses 
1 
testified that the cut was "small," R. 148:79 (Officer Camacho); it bled "a little bit," 
R. 148:54 (witness Geer); and it stopped bleeding within half an hour of the altercation. 
R. 148:110 (the blood had coagulated). In addition, the prosecutor asked Thomas to 
identify the place where the injury was inflicted because "[i]t may not be apparent" to 
jurors. R. 148:68. Under the circumstances, the evidence failed to support a 
"[substantial bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12). 
The State disagrees. It relies on Thomas's testimony and it claims the cut was 
"two to three inches" in length. Br. Appellee, 8, 10, 14, 21. Yet the evidence defies that 
claim. In addition, the State seems to argue that the definition for substantial bodily 
injury is essentially indistinguishable from the definition for simple bodily injury. Id., 
11-19. Even if that were the case, under Utah law, the trial court was required to enter a 
conviction for a lesser offense. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402(1), 77-17-1 (2008). 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW SUPPORT SIMPLE BODILY INJURY. 
A. THE STATE TAKES STATEMENTS IN WHITE'S BRIEF OUT OF 
CONTEXT. 
According to the State, White "concedes" that uthe evidence established that 
[during an assault, Dexter Thomas] suffered a two-to-three-inch facial scar" that was 
visible at trial. Br. Appellee, 8. The State's claims are incorrect for several reasons. 
(1) White Has Not Made Concessions. 
In connection with its claim, the State has failed to cite to any point in the trial 
court or on appeal where White purportedly "concede[d]" that Thomas "suffered a two-
to-three-inch facial scar" that was still visible at trial. Br. Appellee, 8 (no citation). 
Rather, the State has taken statements in White's brief out of context. 
Specifically, White cited in his brief to Thomas's testimony at trial that he had a visible 
mark on his face from a cut that was "'two or three inches'" long. See Br. Appellant, 25 
(quoting R. 148:68). By including that statement in the brief, White has not "conced[ed]" 
Thomas's assertion. See Br. Appellee, 8. Instead, he has identified the evidence 
pursuant to this Court's marshaling requirement. See Br. Appellant, 23-29. 
Undoubtedly, if he had not done so, the State would have claimed that White had failed 
to marshal the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Burkinshaw, 2010 UT App 245, f 11 n.2, 239 
P.3d 1052 ("The State urges this court to decline to review Defendant's sufficiency 
[claim]" because the "Defendant failed to marshal the evidence"). Indeed, the marshaled 
evidence in context gives no credence to Thomas's claim that he has a visible scar two to 
three inches in length. See Br. Appellant, 23-29; see also infra, Arg. A.(2), herein. 
Moreover, if the State is to be believed - and if marshaling the evidence means the 
defendant is conceding the facts (Br. Appellee, 8) - it may be necessary for counsel on 
appeal to forego the marshaling requirement. As it exists, the marshaling requirement 
expects defense counsel to view the facts from the perspective of his opponent, to 
"embrace the 'adversary's position,'" and to play the "devil's advocate" for the analysis 
on appeal. See State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, % 16, 236 P.3d 155 (citation omitted). 
In that regard, it already creates a tension for counsel under recognized standards of 
professionalism. See, e.g., State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994) (the duty of 
loyalty "requires the attorney to refrain from acting as an advocate against the client"). 
In addition, the marshaling requirement allows Utah appellate courts to avoid 
development of the law even when issues have been preserved for appeal. See Maese, 
2010 UT App 106, TH[ 16-17 (although the trial court ruled on the defendant's motion and 
arguments, this Court rejected the issue on the merits because the defendant failed to 
marshal the evidence; "[f]ailure to marshal the evidence" waives an appellant's claims on 
appeal (citation omitted)). Furthermore, the marshaling standard is nonsensical in a 
criminal case since the advocate for the conviction is available and capable of presenting 
its perspective based on the supporting evidence. That advocate is the prosecutor; and 
the nature of the adversary system expects nothing less. But since the law, as it stands, 
requires the defendant in a criminal appeal to marshal the facts, compliance with the 
marshaling requirement does not qualify as a concession of the facts on appeal. Where 
the State has claimed otherwise in its brief here (see Br. Appellee, 8), its claims are 
misplaced. 
(2) The Evidence Fails to Support the State's Claims on Appeal that Thomas 
Received a Two-to-Three-Inch Cut. 
While the State relies in its brief on Thomas's claim that he received a two-to-
three-inch cut, the facts fail to support that claim. See Br. Appellant, 23-29. State wit-
nesses and agents reported a "small cut." R.148:79; see also R. 135Presentence Report, 2 
(a second State officer described the injury as "a small cut" on the face). The cut bled "a 
little bit." R.148:54. It was "a fairly clean cut." R.148:118. Within half an hour of the 
altercation, the cut had stopped bleeding. R.148:l 10 (it coagulated). Thomas did not 
request or receive medical attention for the cut. See R. 148:59-92 (Thomas's testimony). 
And the area of the cut was not apparent to jurors, prompting the prosecutor to ask 
Thomas to identify it. R.148:68. 
In addition, the prosecutor acknowledged the temporary nature of the injury at 
trial, R. 149:212; and he discredited some of Thomas's statements about the cut. See 
R. 149:212 (the prosecutor described a possible one inch cut); see also R. 148:32-33 (the 
prosecutor acknowledged that the case did not support Thomas's claims about the 
altercation).I The cut was not disfiguring even when it was fresh (see State's Ex. 1 & 2); 
Thomas did not describe pain (see R. 148:59-92 (Thomas's testimony)); and the cut did 
not impair the function of a bodily member or organ. Thus, it did not qualify as 
substantial bodily injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12). 
Moreover, the photos of the cut fail to support that it was two to three inches long. 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, photos were taken immediately after the alterca-
tion. The State admitted them in evidence. See Br. Appellant, 26-27; State's Ex. 1 & 2, 
attached to Br. Appellant as Addendum C. State's Exhibit 1 depicts Thomas. Although 
he has blood on the side of his face, his facial features and ear are normal. State's Ex. 1. 
l Thomas believed that someone besides White inflicted the wound, R. 148:76, 87, 89-80; 
and Officer Peterson acknowledged that White may not have caused the injury here. 
R. 148:117 (White was swinging around to the side; and the two cousins were punching 
Thomas "from the top, down"); see also R. 148:50-51, 53; 149:189 (the prosecutor 
acknowledged that the State "cannot show that [the defendant] landed the punch that 
caused the cut"). But even if White did not inflict the injury, he may be liable for the 
conduct of his cousin. See State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 937 n.15 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Notably, both cousins entered guilty pleas for assault, and both cousins received 
sentences for a misdemeanor. See State v. Jamison Dade, Case No. 09190785; State v. 
Derringer Dade, Case No. 09190787. White was convicted of a felony. Those facts were 
not presented to the jury. Nevertheless, while the actual perpetrators were given 
misdemeanor sentences, White is serving a prison term for a felony. 
State's Exhibit 2 is an enlarged close-up of the cut. State's Ex. 2. The photo also 
includes approximately two-thirds of Thomas's ear. Id. The two-thirds portion of the ear 
in the enlarged photo is 2.45 inches in length. Id. And the cut measures only a fraction 
of an inch in length: between .6 and .7 inches. Id. Assuming Thomas's ear in its entirety 
were 3.4 inches long, the cut - according to Thomas - would run almost the length of the 
portion of the ear seen in the photo (2 inches), or almost the length of the ear itself (3 
inches). See R. 148:68 (stating the cut was two to three inches). But the State's evidence 
fails to support the measurement. S^e State's Ex. 2. 
In the alternative, if the cut were two to three inches in length, it would be three to 
four times longer than depicted in the photo, and Thomas's ear likewise would be three to 
four times larger, or nine to thirteen inches. See State's Ex. 2. If Thomas's testimony 
about the length of the cut is correct, his ears are unusually large. But the record does not 
support that interpretation. Compare State's Ex. 1 & 2. And this Court may view the 
photos for itself. See Keyes v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 502 So.2d 223, 226 (La. Ct. App. 
1987) (the record contains the photos and the court is able to examine them on appeal). 
The State's claim that the cut was two to three inches in length (Br. Appellee, 8, 
10, 14, 21) is not supported by the evidence. See also Br. Appellant, 23-29. Moreover, 
White did not concede Thomas's assertion that the cut was two to three inches in length. 
Id. Rather, White has maintained that the cut was small, slight, not disfiguring, and 
insufficient to support substantial bodily injury. See Br. Appellant. 
B. THE STATE CLAIMS THAT THE PHRASE "SUBSTANTIAL BODILY 
INJURY" REFERS TO ANY TRANSITORY OR TEMPORARY, NON-
SERIOUS IMPAIRMENT. YET, THAT INTERPRETATION RENDERS THE 
DEFINITION FOR SIMPLE "BODILY INJURY" SUPERFLUOUS. 
The State maintains that a substantial bodily injury under Utah law is any transi-
tory or temporary non-serious injury that eventually may heal. Br. Appellee, 10. In that 
regard, according to the State, a substantial injury is distinguishable from a serious injury, 
id. 12, which is grave and severe.2 The State also suggests that this Court should defer to 
the jury, since it believed the slight cut qualified as a substantial injury. See id. 13, 14. 
2 The State claims that a substantial injury and a serious injury are distinguishable in that 
a person must engage in intentional conduct for a serious injury, a second degree felony 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a) (2008); and he may engage in reckless conduct 
for a substantial injury, a misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2008). Br. 
Appellee, 13. According to the State's argument, the defendant's mental state is a factor 
in assessing the injury, and if the mental state is greater (i.e., intentional), the injury also 
is greater (i.e., serious). Id. The State's claims are misplaced for several reasons. 
First, the mens rea element is not part of the definition for, and not a factor in 
assessing, "[sjerious bodily injury" or "[substantial bodily injury." See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-601(11), (12). Rather, the mental state is a separate element of the crime, and the 
State must prove both the mental state and the level of the injury for a conviction under 
each respective provision. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102, 76-5-103 (2008). 
Second, the legislature re-wrote the aggravated assault statute in 2010. Under the 
new statute, reckless conduct resulting in serious injury may support a 2d degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103(2)(b) (Supp. 2010), 76-2-102 (2008) (when the statute does 
not specify the mental state, "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice"). Thus, the 
law appears to reject the State's claim that intentional conduct results in a serious injury. 
Third, the assault statutes use different mental states for all levels of injury. For 
example, Section 76-5-102 requires proof of "attempt" to cause simple bodily injury for a 
misdemeanor offense. Id. at § 76-5-102(l)(a), (2) (2008). Proof of attempt requires 
proof of intent. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (2008) (defining intent); State v. Casey, 
2003 UT 55,112, 82 P.3d 1106 (attempt requires "proof that the defendant acted 
intentionally"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)(a), (l)(b)(i) (2008) (attempt requires proof 
of intent). In addition, a defendant may intentionally inflict substantial bodily injury for 
a misdemeanor conviction under Sections 76-5-102(l)(c),(3)(a) and 76-2-102 (2008) 
(when the statute does not specify the mental state, "intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice"). In short, the mens rea element is irrelevant to the definition for 
substantial or serious bodily injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11), (12). 
The State's arguments are misplaced for several reasons. 
(1) The State's Arguments Center on Thomas's Testimony that the Cut Was 
Two to Three Inches Long. But the Evidence Fails to Support Thomas's 
Claim, and Thus, the State's Arguments. 
The State's arguments for substantial bodily injury rely on the notion that the cut 
near Thomas's ear was two to three inches in length. IdL 8, 10, 14, 21. But, as set forth 
above, the record does not support that claim. See supra, Arg. A. According to the 
State's photos, if the injury were two to three inches in length, Thomas's ear would be 
nine to thirteen inches long. Id.; State's Ex. 1 & 2; Keyes, 502 So.2d at 226 (the court is 
able to examine photos). That is absurd. The factual basis for the State's claims is flawed. 
(2) The State's Definitions for "Disfigurement" and "Substantial Bodily 
Injury" Swallow Part of the Definition for Simple "Bodily Injury". 
The State's arguments for substantial bodily injury rely on an incomplete 
definition for the term "disfigurement," as that term is used to describe "[sjerious bodily 
injury" and "[substantial bodily injury." Specifically, the State claims that a temporary 
disfigurement - as used to define "[substantial bodily injury," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
601(12) - is a transitory non-serious "impairment or injury" to appearance. Br. Appellee, 
10, 14. Yet common usage does not equate the term disfigurement with mere 
"impairment or injury" to appearance. Rather, according to the dictionary, a 
disfigurement is a defect, a deformity; it means "to impair (as in beauty) by deep and 
persistent injuries." Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 358 (11th ed. 2003); Webster's 
New World College Dictionary, 412 (4th ed. 1999). It is a defaced or distorted 
appearance. 
In addition, in Funk v. Indus. Comm'n, the Arizona court considered whether a 
facial scar qualified as "disfigurement." 808 P.2d 827, 829-30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (cite 
omitted). It recognized that under Arizona law, a disfigurement did not have to be 
"serious." IcL In construing the term, the court relied on ordinary dictionary definitions 
and common meaning "'as understood by the average man.'" Id. at 830 (cite omitted). 
Notably, the court did not construe the term to be a mere injury or impairment. Instead, 
sources defined disfigurement to mean "to mar the appearance or beauty of; deform; 
deface;" "to mar the effect or excellence of"; "to impair, as shape or form; to mar; to 
deface; to injure the appearance or attractiveness of" "to impair fas in beauty) by deep 
and persistent injuries" Id. at 829-30 (citing dictionary sources; emphasis added). The 
Arizona court also considered case law, which equated the term "disfigurement" with 
"'an outward observable scar or mutilation which tends to mar the appearance of the 
body'"; and cases construed the term to mean, '"that which impairs or injures the beauty, 
symmetry or appearance of a person or thing; that which renders unsightly, misshapen or 
imperfect, or deforms in some manner.'" Id. at 830 (cites omitted; emphasis added). It 
ruled that a facial scar is not necessarily a disfigurement; and a disfigurement required 
"connotations of marring" or distortion in appearance. Id. 
Where the State here has limited the definition for disfigurement to a mere 
"impairment or injury" to appearance, Br. Appellee, 10, its interpretation is insufficient, 
and it renders the definition for simple "[bjodily injury" useless in part. That is, the 
legislature has defined a simple bodily injury as a temporary non-serious injury or 
physical impairment. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3) (bodily injury is "physical pain, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition"). Since the State's analysis fails to 
make any distinction between a substantial injury and a simple injury, it ignores a basic 
rule of statutory construction. See State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ^ 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (the 
Court avoids "'interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative'" (citation omitted)). 
(3) Contrary to the State's Arguments on Appeal, the Legislature Has 
Specified that Serious Injury and Substantial Injury Are Closely Related: 
Those Phrases Apply if an Injury Is Grave or Significant. 
Contrary to the State's claims (see Br. Appellee, 14-15), White is not asking this 
Court to rewrite the statute for substantial bodily injury. He is asking this Court to give 
meaning to the plain language of the statute and to distinguish between the different 
levels of injuries under Utah law as set forth in existing statutory law and case law. 
Indeed, the legislature has specifically used the terms "[substantial" and "[sjerious" to 
describe not only the levels of injuries under Utah law (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
601(11), (12)), but also to describe an element of the offense for an assault under Section 
76-5-102(3)(a) (substantial injury), and an aggravated assault under Section 76-5-103 
(serious injury). Plain language supports that the provisions defining "[s]erious" and 
"[substantial" injuries apply when the injuries are grave and considerable. Webster's 
New World College Dictionary, 1309 (4th ed. 1999) (defining serious to mean earnest, 
grave, or dangerous); i± at 1428 (defining "substantial" to mean "considerable; ample; 
large"). The provisions do not apply when the injury is minor, insignificant, or results in 
a slight non-distorting blemish. 
In addition, Utah courts have a tradition of construing statutes as a whole and "in 
harmony with other provisions in the same statute." State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ^ [ 10, 
203 P.3d 1000 (cite omitted); Br. Appellant, 13-14. In that regard, in order to distinguish 
between the three levels of injury, Utah law recognizes that a "[substantial" injury is 
closely related to, but does not qualify as, a "[s]erious" injury. According to the plain 
language of the statute, a "[substantial bodily injury" is "bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury'' but causing protracted pain, disfigurement, or impairment of a 
bodily member or organ. Utah Code Ann. 76-1-601(12) (emphasis added). Use of the 
phrase "not amounting to" supports that the legislature intended to create a definition for 
an injury that was slightly less than serious: Le., substantial bodily injury. Thus, the 
definitions for serious injury and substantial injury apply when the injury is grave 
(serious) or considerable (substantial). Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11) and 
(12); see also Br. Appellant, 18-23. 
Legislative history further supports the close relationship. When Representative 
Ellertson introduced House Bill 159 in 1995 to enact the definition of substantial bodily 
injury, he stated the definition filled a gap in the code and was intended to apply to cases 
"in which the defendant causes substantial bodily injury, but not enough to really meet 
the strict definition of serious bodily injury for an aggravated assault." Statements of R. 
Lee Ellertson, House Floor Debate, HB 159, February 9, 1995 (emphasis added). Thus, 
history supports that the legislature intended "[sjerious bodily injury" and "[substantial 
bodily injury" to apply to major or significant injuries, with the definition for a 
substantial injury to fill a gap when the significant injury did not qualify as "[sjerious." 
Case law also supports the close relationship. In State ex rel. D.K., this Court 
stated that numerous blows to the victim's head and chest, a possible loss of 
consciousness, a tear to the victim's ear, and ongoing pain, dizziness, and visits to the 
doctor, supported serious bodily injury under the probable-cause standard. 2006 UT App 
461, <[| 10 & n.4, 153 P.3d 736. But the reasonable-doubt standard presented a "separate 
question altogether"; under the more exacting standard of proof, the injuries may qualify 
as something less. IdL % 11; see also State ex rel. M.F., No. 20090121, 2009 UT App 398 
(unpublished) (stating that broken facial bones and nerve damage may qualify as serious 
injury for bindover proceedings, and recognizing that reasonable minds may conclude 
that the injuries were substantial); State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368,ffl[ 19-20, 993 P.2d 
232 (a broken jaw "wired shut for six weeks with resulting eating difficulties, weight 
loss, extraction and later replacement of a tooth, and continuing pain" may "conceivably" 
qualify as "substantial" or "serious bodily injury"). 
Notably, the same close association does not exist between the phrases simple 
"[b]odily injury" and "[substantial bodily injury." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3), 
(12). That is, if an injury is minor or slight, it qualifies as a simple injury. A small cut that 
does not cause pain (see R. 148:59-92 (Thomas's testimony)), does not distort a person's 
appearance in any respect, and does not require medical care (id.) is not a significant or 
substantial injury; it is simple bodily injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3).3 
3 The State seems to claim that this Court should consider whether an injury has healed 
immediately to classify it under Utah's three-tier system. Br. Appellee, 14. In this case, 
the State went to trial on the charges five months after the altercation. At that point, the 
cut was healed: the prosecutor had to ask Thomas to identify the injury since it may not 
(4) The State Suggests this Court Should Defer to the Jury's Decision. Yet It 
Also Recognizes that the Appeal Raises a Question of Law; Thus, Deference 
to the Jury Is Inappropriate. 
The State's analysis for substantial bodily injury is flawed where the State claims 
the jury here considered the injury to be substantial and disfiguring. Br. Appellee, 13,14 
The jury's determination is irrelevant to the analysis. The State has acknowledged in its 
brief that the issue here concerns statutory construction: whether the injury at issue 
qualified as substantial under Utah law. See Br. Appellee, 8; see also Br. Appellant, 13-
14. In that instance, it would be inappropriate to defer to the jury for the answer. See 
State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, f^ 4, 217 P.3d 265 (statutory interpretation is a question of 
law); State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, *h 8, 171 P.3d 426 (same). Moreover, the issue here 
concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Br. Appellant. In 
several cases, Utah juries have believed evidence supported a conviction, even where the 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. See, e.g., State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 
ITI15-18, 63 P.3d 94 (evidence was insufficient for conviction); State v. Gonzales, 2000 
UT App 136, U 21, 2 P.3d 954 (same); State v. Merila, 966 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 
be apparent to jurors. R. 148:68. Indeed, injuries heal at different rates depending on fac-
tors unrelated to the original harm, including a person's age, general health, and physical 
fitness. If the definitions for the different levels of injuries considered healing, a defen-
dant would be justified in seeking a continuous involving a significant injury to show that 
the harm was neither "permanent" nor "protracted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11). 
Moreover, in State v. Leleae, this Court declined to focus on healing and medical 
intervention to differentiate between the various levels of injury under Utah law. See 
1999 UT App 368, •jffl 14, 19-20. There, the victim suffered a broken jaw and several 
minor head injuries. Id. f^ 13. Doctors had to wire his jaw shut and extract a tooth. Id. 
The jaw healed within six weeks, doctors replaced the tooth, and the victim recovered 
from the injuries by the time of trial. Id. ^ 14. Consequently, the defendant argued the 
injuries were not serious. Id. fflf 19-20. This Court disagreed. See id. f^ 20. 
1998) (same). Proper analysis does not defer to the jury's assessment. This Court "has 
the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence" on appeal. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
In sum, the State's argument on appeal relies on the premise that the cut near 
Thomas's ear was two to three inches in length. Br. Appellee, 8, 10, 14, 21. Yet the 
close-up enlarged photo of the cut supports that the cut was only a fraction of an inch in 
length. See State's Ex. 2; see also supra, Arg. A. (small cut; minimal bleeding). Thus, 
the factual premise for the State's argument is flawed. Moreover, White has not 
conceded Thomas's testimony concerning the length or visibility of the slight cut. See 
Br. Appellant. 
In addition, the State defines "[substantial bodily injury" to mean a transitory 
"impairment or injury" that may "eventually fully heal." Br. Appellee, 10. If the State's 
definition is correct, there would be no relevant distinction between a substantial injury 
and a simple injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3) (a simple injury is "any 
impairment of physical condition"). Indeed, the definition for a substantial injury would 
render the statute for a simple injury useless in part. But see Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f^ 8 
(the Court avoids "'interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative'" (citation omitted)). Yet even in that instance, the definition for a simple 
injury governs: according to the legislature, when the evidence supports either 
interpretation, the defendant may be convicted only of a lesser offease. Utah Code Ann. 
§77-17-1. Thus, the State's interpretation supports a reduction in the conviction to a 
misdemeanor offense. See id. 
CONCLUSION 
The felony conviction is in error. As set forth above and in the Brief of Appellant, 
White respectfully requests the entry of an order to reverse the felony conviction and 
dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence, or in the alternative, the entry of an order to 
vacate or modify the felony conviction and to remand the case to the trial court for entry 
of a misdemeanor conviction. 
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